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Citizens’ tax compliance should not only respond to the quality of formal institutions but might 
also be culturally driven. We contribute to this literature by investigating whether tax morale, 
an individual’s intrinsic non-pecuniary motivation to comply with taxes, is associated with the 
cultural values (following Hofstede’s typology) held by this individual. The analysis exploits 
four waves of the European Values Survey (1981 to 2010) across 48 countries. The cultural 
dimensions are constructed through a polychoric Principal Component Analysis on a set of 
relevant survey items consistent with Hofstede’s definitions. Ordered logit estimations suggest 
that while values of individualism and femininity are associated with higher individual’s tax 
morale, power distance and uncertainty avoidance are associated with lower tax morale. These 
results remain consistent as we increase the level of granularity of our investigation through 
within-region analyses and, subsequently, within-cohort analyses. We argue that these results 
inevitably enrich the emerging debate about cultural values and citizens’ compliance with 
formal institutions. They also indicate that societal culture as well as individual values should 






1. Introduction  
 
Bridging culture and institutions has been a recurrent theme within the institutional economic 
literature in recent years (Guiso et al 2016; Tabellini 2008; De Jong 2011). The role of culture 
on different economic outcomes and measures of nations performance is increasingly being 
emphasised (Berggren et al. 2019; Cruz-García and Peiró-Palomino 2019; Tabellini 2010). 
However, the inter-play between cultural and institutional aspects remain underexplored 
(Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Guiso et al 2006; Hodgson 2006), particularly regarding the role 
of culture on individuals’ attitudes towards rent-seeking behaviour and compliance with the 
law (Alm et al 2017; Hodgson and Jiang 2007). We aim to bridge this gap by investigating the 
relationship between individual-level cultural value orientation and tax morale, commonly 
defined as intrinsic non-pecuniary motivations towards tax compliance.     
Institutions, commonly understood as those set of norms and rules able to constrain human 
behaviour and social relations, do provide “norms of governance” that should reduce rent-
seeking behaviour (Hodgson 2006; North 1990)1. Nevertheless, the institutional economic 
debate (Hodgson 2006; Ostrom 2010) addressed a specific key question: why do those 
behaviours that institutions seek to constrain, such as tax evasion, persist? We argue that 
cultural values influence individual’s attitude towards institutional compliance. This is because 
culture shares with institutions the ability of influencing individuals as well as collective 
preferences and attitudes. In other words, culture and institutions refer to beliefs and values 
through which individuals’ conjecture what is right and what is wrong (Greif 2006; Hodgson 
and Jiang 2007). These values and beliefs work as long as they are internalised, maintained and 
communicated within a group of individuals, a cohort and or a socio-economic geographical 
space such as countries and regions (Greif 1994; Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 2011). Focusing on 
tax morale is ideal for our purpose since it narrows the attention on the individuals’ cognitive 
determinants of tax compliance, a moral duty and, hence, tax evasion - an improper behaviour 
(Frey and Torgler 2007). 
The focus on tax morale has two additional advantages. Firstly, it challenges mainstream 
economic theory by arguing that the probability of audits and the degree of punishment do not 
fully explain tax evasion (Filippin et al. 2013; Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas 2010; Torgler 
                                                            
1 Here we conceptualise institutions as rules, as opposed to institutions as equilibrium. Greif and Kingston (2011) 
discuss the differences between these two conceptualisations. We also consider formal and informal institutions 
as jointly shaping behaviour, thus an individual divergence in behaviour within a specific formal institutional 
context can be explained by informal institutions. Finally, we capture informal institutions through cultural values, 
and informal institutions and culture will thus be synonymous throughout the text. 
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2005). Secondly, it embraces the institutional economic view according to which social and 
economic exchanges do not occur outside the moral sphere (Traxler, 2010). Culture might thus 
be especially relevant since it influences individuals’ view about their own responsibility and 
role within their community as well as their view about the responsibility and the role of the 
public institutions (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). Accordingly, “norms of governance”, 
including those of tax compliance, rely not only upon institutional enforcement, but also on the 
individuals’ normative commitment and psychological temperament (Bowles 1998). We 
inevitably emphasise the central role of cultural values since they will condition and shape 
individuals’ commitments to norms of governance and attitudes towards compliance to formal 
institutions (Alesina and Giuliano 2015). We thus conceptualise cultural norms as informal 
institutions, which contribute to explaining how formal rules are fulfilled in practice. This 
approach is typical of the literature on “institutions-as-rules”, where informal institutions are 
often conceptualised as the missing link between formal rules and behaviour (Greif and 
Kingston, 2011). In addition, culture is commonly interpreted as a way to measure informal 
institutions in empirical research (e.g. Williamson, 2009). 
Following the above theoretical perspective, we operationalise cultural value orientations by 
using the four cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1980; 2001) namely individualism 
vs. collectivism, power distance, femininity vs. masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.  
Our analysis of tax morale exploits four waves of the European Value Survey (EVS 1981 to 
2010) across a total of 48 countries, mostly Europeans with the addition of US and Canada. 
The present study exploits individual level data with a potential total number of 164,997 
observations across all waves. The cultural dimensions are constructed using a polychoric 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on a set of relevant survey items consistent with the 
approach used in Davis and Williamson (2019) and in Beugeldijsk et al. (2015).  
Our baseline model  relies on ordered logit estimations where individual’s tax morale is a 
function of those four cultural variables, initially one-by-one and then in a “horse race” 
regression, and an extensive set of covariates including demographic, contextual and temporal 
variables. As suggested by Tabellini (2010) and Duranton et al. (2009), the baseline model 
considers country fixed effect in order to capture possible omitted time-invariant cross-country 
differences. Our empirical evidence reveals that individual values are significantly associated 
with tax morale. Values of individualism and femininity are indeed positively associated with 
individual’s tax morale, while power distance and uncertainty avoidance are negatively 
associated with it.  
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These results provide an important empirical contribution to the literature and confirm 
theoretical claims that cultural dimensions should relate to individuals’ rent-seeking attitudes 
such as tax morale. Let’s analyse them in order. 
First, values of individualism promote self-determination as well as an in-depth sense of 
individual’s responsibility towards legal rules and institutional compliance. This might 
increase the level of tax morale among citizens whose attitudes are driven by such values.           
Regarding the role of femininity, unlike values of masculinity that emphasise personal 
achievement and material success, values of femininity reflect the importance of solidarity and 
cooperative behaviour for a more sustainable society and improvement in the overall human 
well-being (Hofstede, 2001). This might drive individuals to be more morally and ethically 
inclined towards tax compliance  
Regarding power distance, this indicates the extent to which unequal distribution of power and 
hierarchical relations are accepted in a society without additional justification. Consistently, 
power distance values drive individual’s perception of public authority exploiting the use of 
power for the benefit of the elite, at the cost of a more unequal redistribution of public 
resources. This is likely to undermine individual’s civic conscience and moral attitude towards 
institutional and tax compliance, since tax collection is viewed as a system with redistributive 
goals (Hofstede 2001).   
Finally, regarding the role of uncertainty avoidance within the state-citizens relationship, the 
literature shows controversial perspectives. Values of uncertainty avoidance promote low 
individual’s tolerance towards ambiguity and drives individual’s preferences towards 
conditions of predictability and transparency (Hofstede 2001). Accordingly, we might expect 
that where public processes, including tax systems, are perceived transparent and accountable, 
individual’s compliance with rules increases. However, the complexity of the tax system and 
the lack of transparency of the tax collection procedures might lower the moral cost of rent-
seeking behaviour such as tax evasion (Torgler 2005). As a result, individual’s driven by values 
of uncertainty avoidance may be more inclined to tax evade as they are also strongly averse to 
feelings of ambiguity and lack of clarity, and would thus avoid engaging with a complex tax 
system (Richardson 2008).         
We further demonstrate that these results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of different 
contextual and attitudinal covariates including variables of institutional trust and prosocial 
behaviour, potential explanatory factors in the tax morale literature. This indicates that cultural 
values matter per se, rather than through mediation by other values expected to respond to 
them, such as institutional trust and pro-sociality. 
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We also report a series of sensitivity analyses and model extensions. In particular, to mitigate 
possible endogeneity problems, we extend our baseline model :, since tax morale and culture 
might be co-determined by some latent factors omitted in our baseline model, following 
Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), we increase the level of granularity of our analysis. Hence, 
we replicate our model by investigating within-region variation and, subsequently, by 
considering within-cohort variation in tax morale. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses a literature review. 
Section 3 introduces data and sources. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and robustness 
checks. Section 5 finally concludes.  
 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
 
2.1 Tax Morale, Institutions and Culture  
Rent-seeking behaviours, such as tax evasion, are a violation of institutional compliance. Tax 
collection systems are more effective when the public authority has the ability to enforce 
contracts, as well as increase individuals’ compliance to institutions (Savoia and Sen 2015). 
This inevitably passes through the quality of the bureaucracy. Consistent evidence shows that 
bureaucracies recruiting civil servants on a merit-basis reduce the spread of corruption and 
other rent-seeking behaviour (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017). There is, though, an increasing 
consensus that fiscal capacity may rely on the complementarity between objective measures of 
formal institutions and subjective measures of individuals’ values and beliefs driving 
taxpayers’ motivations to comply with taxes (Savoia and Sen 2015). In other words, cultural 
values, which partly shape individual values, are important informal institutions explaining 
how formal rules are followed in practice (Williamson, 2009). In fact, empirical works show 
that tax evasion not only varies across countries but also across different regions subject to the 
same national government system  (Lago Penas and Lago Penas 2010; Torgler 2005). 
Appropriate institutions should reduce rent-seeking problems, since institutions are set of 
norms and rules able to shape and constrain human behaviours (Hodgson 2006; North 1990, 
Ostrom 2010). However, there is an increasing consensus that institutional conformity requires 
social support and public engagement besides appropriate formal institutions (Tavits 2010). In 
other words, institutional conformity is possible if citizens’ attitudes towards institutional 
conformity is positively motivated, and if cultural values are complementary and supportive of 
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formal rules. Within this perspective, tax morale is argued to connect attitudes to behaviour, as 
it reflects a positive predictor of citizens complying with their tax duty (Cummings et al. 2009; 
Torgler 2012). Tax morale, generally defined as individuals’ intrinsic non-pecuniary 
motivations to pay taxes (Frey 1997), looks at tax compliance as a matter of individual’s moral 
considerations rather than a mere taxpayers’ reaction to law enforcement (Traxler 2010). Social 
values can strengthen these intrinsic motivations, as they are likely to influence individual’s 
choices and behaviours (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). In the literature to date, the two main 
channels that have been used to explain individual’s tax morale are the following. On the one 
hand, tax morale increases among individuals that are more prosocial and, hence, willing to 
cooperate towards the public good, especially if they expect that other citizens will do so (Frey 
and Torgler 2007). On the other hand, tax morale increases among individuals who trust public 
institutions as they are confident that public authority will act on the interest of tax contributors 
(Daude et al. 2013; Feld and Frey 2002; Torgler 2012). If the State’s commitment is perceived 
to be low, the moral cost of tax evading decreases (Torgler 2005). Hence, citizens might feel 
less inclined to respect obligations, such as paying taxes, and less concerned about being 
sanctioned for their rent-seeking behaviour (Frey and Torgler 2007).      
To our knowledge, however, the cultural perspective of tax morale has been only marginally 
explored. Particularly, considering that individual’s cultural values might influence what 
individual conjectures as right or wrong (Greif 2006). This means that a set of internalised 
values and beliefs contribute to regulate not only social exchanges between peers (co-citizens) 
but also those occurring between individuals and ruling public institutions. This is because 
social values influence individuals’ view about their own responsibility and role within their 
community as well as their view about the responsibility and the role of the public institutions 
(Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012).      
In the few pioneering works conducted so far in laboratory experiments and survey-based 
research, culture assumes a secondary role and is mainly identified with the country of origin 
of the participants to the experiments or to the survey (Cummings et al 2009; Torgler 2006). 
To isolate the impact of culture on tax morale, holding constant economic and institutional 
factors, some works use linguistic cultural aspects of distinct groups (Torgler and Schneider 
2007) or the level of tax morale in the country of origin of migrants (Kountouris and 
Remoundou 2013).  
This literature has crucially increased the attention towards the importance of culture, 
encouraging further and more consistent research in this direction (Alesina and Giuliano 2015). 
More recently, criticisms have been raised on the importance of adopting indicators able to 
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capture the multifaceted nature of culture and to exploit cultural variations within country and 
across individuals who are subject to the same institutional and environmental framework 
(Luttmer and Singhal 2014). Such indicators would dramatically improve the empirical 
strategy and help building a more consistent conceptual and theoretical framework better able 
to trace the relational mechanisms between tax morale and its determinants. 
 
2.2 Cultural Dimensions  
Culture is understood as a repetition of common behaviours and practiced codes of conduct 
that structure interactions within societies (North 1990, Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). It has 
been also defined as values and ideas specific to a group and passed-on down the generations 
(e.g. Guiso et al., 2006) or among peers through communication and social learning (Greif 
1994; Spranz et al. 2012; Tavits 2010). The simple inter-generational transmission of contents 
is not enough, though. Douglass North (2008, p.24) underlines that learning is a tool that 
individuals use in order to reduce uncertainty. Values and beliefs embedded in a society can 
thus be said to represent the cumulative learning of that society, facilitating decision-making 
in response to specific situations (North, 2008). 
Individuals’ attitudes and behaviours are influenced by their values and beliefs acquired and 
consolidated through learning, repeated and consistent interactions and social exchanges with 
other members of society (Spranz et al. 2012). Values and ideas are drivers of human behaviour 
as they provide guidelines regarding good versus bad, or appropriate versus inappropriate 
behaviour within specific groups and contexts (Greif 2006).  
The empirical literature is rich in examples in which the values shared by a group have been 
shown to be meaningful and relevant concepts. For example, Guiso et al., 2006, Tabellini, 
2008, and Alesina and Giuliano, 2015 all present detailed literature reviews illustrating the 
relevance of beliefs and values in economics – but we note that none of them seems to have 
tackled tax compliance. 
Cross-cultural studies have for long recognised the importance of national culture, and 
taxonomies have been developed to accurately define and label cultural values that allow for 
an effective discrimination or identification of contrasting cultural groups. These taxonomies 
are, by definition, empirical constructs, which have been validated, through time, thanks to 
their repeated use in studies investigating a broad range of behaviours. The one we use in our 
analysis, and widely considered both in economics and cultural studies, is the one proposed by 
Hofstede (1980, 2001). Hofstede treats culture as “the collective programming of the mind” 
able to distinguish an individual or a group of individuals from another. By “mind”, he refers 
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to individual’s cognitive skills such as thinking, feeling and acting (Hofstede 2001). On the 
basis of this background perspective, Hofstede distinguishes four fundamental cultural 
dimensions: (i) collectivism versus individualism, (ii) uncertainty avoidance, (iii) power 
distance and (iv) femininity versus masculinity2. These four dimensions capture specific 
aspects of the mental map individuals rely on to guide their decisions. They are associated with 
very specific values and beliefs, shared by those who were socialised in a specific country 
(Hofstede 1981; 2001). Originally, these dimensions have been constructed to analyse 
employees work-related values within a multinational corporation (Hofstede 1981). Later on, 
Hofstede’s taxonomy of culture has been increasingly employed in cross-cultural and business 
studies (Beugelsdijk and Welzel 2018; Kaasa 2015), economics and institutional studies (Davis 
and Williamson, 2019; Tarabar 2019).   
Collectivism as opposed to individualism reflects the extent to which individuals are self-
reliant or embedded in groups (Hofstede, 2001). In individualistic societies, people act as 
individuals and not as members of a group. Their attitudes and behaviours are driven by values 
of individual freedom, autonomy and self-determination. This implies that individuals respond 
less to social pressure and, at the same time, they are assumed to take responsibility for their 
own actions. On the contrary, in highly collectivistic societies, values of amoral familism a-la 
Banfield (1958) dominate individual behaviour and attitude, as individuals act with the interests 
of their small reference group in mind, even though this implies higher moral and economic 
cost for the entire collective (Kaasa 2015). Beyond Hofstede, this is a concept that has 
generated a large amount of empirical evidence (see for example Gorodnichenko and Roland 
2017).  
Uncertainty avoidance typically promotes order, consistency and values predictability. 
Changes are, thus, considered with suspicion. On the contrary, in societies with low uncertainty 
avoidance, people will typically be more willing to take risk and may be inclined to see change 
as an opportunity. High uncertainty avoidance is thus often associated with a greater reliance 
on rules and regulations, or established processes, to guide more precisely how people are 
expected to act (House et al., 2004). Regarding the state-citizens’ relationship, contexts scoring 
high in uncertainty avoidance can count on a large number of precisely written laws and 
unwritten rules necessary to fill the gap of ambiguity, even though all these rules cannot be 
respected and even though the procedures and applications of these formal rules are very long. 
                                                            
2 Later on, Hofstede’s added some additional cultural dimensions that have however appeared to be more narrowly 
relevant and/or less reliable in the Western culture contexts, see a discussion in Taras et al. (2009). 
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In high uncertainty avoidance context, citizens tend to hold negative views towards politicians, 
civil servants and the legal systems as well as towards young people and change (Hofstede et 
al. 2010). 
Power distance pertains to the degree of hierarchy prevailing in a given society. Societies 
scoring high on power distance are characterized by an unequal distribution of wealth and 
power, generally accepted by individuals without further scrutiny. Individuals are expected to 
know their place in society and accept the authority of higher rank individuals. In low power 
distance societies, social structures are less rigid, and hierarchy/authority is more easily 
challenged. These societies are characterized by more equal opportunities (Hofstede et al 
2010).   
In societies characterized by femininity, individuals emphasize social relationships, quality of 
life, notions of care and nurturing. Feminine values emphasise the importance of welfare 
society and the goal of equal opportunity against poverty and economic exclusions (Hofstede 
2001). Feminine value-oriented societies such as the ones in Scandinavian countries have been 
reported to prefer large welfare functional state recording low level of tax evasion and high 
individuals’ propensity to cooperate in favour of the public good (Hofstede 2001). On the 
contrary, masculine value-oriented societies  give more importance to achievements, heroism 
and material success (Hofstede 2001).  
Other taxonomies exist, including the one developed by Schwartz (2011), as well as other 
measures of culture, such as those proposed by Tabellini (2008, 2010): including trust, respect, 
obedience and control for example. However, Hofstede’s remain the most popular one. It has 
been extensively validated as providing a meaningful characterization of people’s mental 
schemes (Beugelidijsk and Welzel, 2018), and it is thus the one we will be using in our 
empirical analysis. In fact, the cultural dimensions of Hofstede have been identified in a 
growing number of empirical studies as predictors of different aspects of institutional 
performance (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017) including contract enforcement efficiency 
(Cline and Williamson 2017), efficiency-enhancing reforms (Tarabar 2017), rule of law, 
reduced corruption and quality of governance (Kyriacou 2016). From a more socio-economic 
perspective, evidence using individual data from the World Values Survey reports that the 
cultural dimension of individualism increases gender equality in terms of employment, income, 
education and political leadership (Davis and Williamson 2019). Individualism appears also to 
provide a socio-cultural background favouring economic development, economic growth, 
higher rate of innovation and increasing wealth (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017).  
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Some have emphasised the persistence of national culture (Kaasa and Minkov 2020). In this 
context, culture is measured as “cultural traits” persistent through time and within a social 
group – such as Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for example (2001). This also means that 
culture can be appropriately proxied through specific exogenous characteristics (e.g. country 
of origins for migrants, language structure, etc.) relevant to the socialization context of 
individuals, and thus to the internalization of those cultural constructs. 
Alternatively, other schools of thoughts emphasise the idea of change and evolution of culture. 
Such an approach would be more in line with Inglehart’s dynamic conceptualisation of culture 
(see Beugelsdijk and Welzel, 2018 for a discussion of both approaches). In this literature, 
culture is seen as changing through time, in particular to reflect changes in economic 
circumstances and their impact on expressed needs. Recent studies using public opinion 
surveys have shown that the values typically used to measure culture have indeed changed 
through time and across generations (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015). Economists have however 
sometimes interpreted a change in values through time as a reason to doubt the validity of the 
relevant indicator of culture. Indeed, some economists would interpret instability in the 
concepts as noise (see Zanella and Bellani, 2019). Here we want to explicitly control for this 
individual-specific time-variant values, to test the extent to which they inform behaviour. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
We use individual level data from four waves of the European Values Survey (EVS)3 covering 
the time span between 1981 and 2009. This allows us to assess different values and beliefs for 
up to 164,997 respondents across 48 countries4.  
The variable on tax morale originates from a question asking to what extent the respondent 
thinks that cheating on taxes is justifiable, with 1 reflecting that cheating on taxes is ‘Always 
justifiable’ and 10 ‘Never justifiable’. While the majority of the respondents across all 
countries find cheating on taxes largely unjustifiable, we found interesting variations across 
time and countries which contribute to motivating the present study.   
                                                            
3 The World Value Survey and the European Value Survey are part of the same “family” and contain a large 
number of over-lapping survey questions. They are among the most commonly used surveys to operationalise 
cultural values. We are using an extended version of the EVS to limit our analysis to a set of countries on which 
Hofstede’s cultural values are well established. 
4 The details of the methodology behind the surveys such as sampling techniques, administration, response rates 
as well as detailed description of all variables, countries participating in each wave can be found in the ‘EVS 
1981-2008 Variable Report Longitudinal Data Files. 
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Consistent with Davis and Williamson (2019) and Beugeldijsk et al. (2015), each of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions is calculated using a Principal Component Analysis on a set of relevant 
survey items from the EVS, selected to reflect Hofstede’s definitions. This approach allows us 
to construct a composite variable representing an underlying concept in the initial set of 
variables analysed, relying on the empirically observed level of correlation among these 
variables (Hair et al., 2014). More specifically, given the non-continuous nature of some items, 
we use polychoric PCA, which relies on polychoric rather than Pearson correlations. 
Polychoric PCA has been specifically designed by Kolenikov and Angeles (2004) for this kind 
of variables and uses “maximum likelihood to calculate how that continuous variable would 
have to be split up in order to produce the observed data” (Moser & Felton, 2009, p. 108). It 
therefore produces more accurate factors than a regular PCA. From each PCA we extracted 
components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, and for each of these, we created synthetic 
indices as weighted sums of the variables charging with a factor loading of at least 0.4, as 
standard in the literature (e.g. Hair et al., 2014). We eliminated the components which did not 
generate a construct with the expected signs variables’ loading. This allows us to construct new 
composite indicators that capture a substantial share of the variance in the original set of 
variables, while reflecting unidimensional underlying concepts consistent with Hofstede’s 
original cultural dimensions (as in Beugelsdijk et al., 2015). This led us to select a unique 
construct for each of Hofstede’s cultural dimension (see formulas below), which we then 
standardised.   
 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.41 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑗𝑜𝑏 
−0.68 ∗  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑: 𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
+0.59 ∗  𝐵𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑣𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚 = 0.55 ∗  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑗𝑜𝑏 
+0.54 ∗  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
+0.49 ∗  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 
+0.38 ∗  𝐻𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑑𝑜 𝑦𝑜𝑢 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑦𝑜𝑢 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒  
 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 0.59 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑏 
+ 0.53 ∗  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 




𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.42 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑜 𝑦𝑜𝑢 𝑔𝑜 𝑡𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ 
−0.45 ∗  𝐴𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑜𝑢 𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
+ 0.42 ∗   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ 
+ 0.44 ∗  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑑 
+ 0.48 ∗  𝐺𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
 
Following the literature on tax morale, we also control for other independent variables such as 
institutional trust (Alm & Torgler 2006; Daude et al. 2013), prosocial behaviour (Frey and 
Torgler 2007)5, religiosity (Torgler 2006) and a series of socio-economic and demographic 
covariates including gender, year of birth, marital status, religious denomination, years in 
education, employment status, income level6, region of residence at NUTS2 level and cohort. 
We report the construction of the latter in the next section. Table A1 reports summary statistics. 
 
3.1. Creation of the Cohorts  
Following Beugelsdijk et al (2015), we build a detailed decomposition of the cohort groupings 
by exploiting two elements that we regard as exogenous features of interviewees’ 
characteristics, or in other words not directly linked to a personal choice: age bracket (people 
cannot decide when to be born) and location within a NUTS2 region (people cannot decide 
where to be born7). Let us comment on them in order. As far as age is concerned, we posit that 
a “generational” change of culture is only possible after at least two/three decades and therefore 
we split the groupings in people born before World War II, people born during the war up to 
the late 60s (watershed moment on shift of cultural values at the world level) and finally born 
in more recent decades. Location is a key “institutional element” shaping the way we think and 
process information, in turn driving our actions. Therefore, a fined grained NUTS2 
classification is a comprehensive way to identify the institutional roots of our individual 
responses. The top panel of Table 1 describes the “Age-Based” cohort decomposition into three 
parts, showing for each cultural value how many individuals are counted in our dataset, the “()” 
                                                            
5 We also recognise the independent role of institutional trust and pro-social behaviour, and therefore run the 
regressions without such controls. The results are fully consistent.  
6 This is self-reported. See the use regional GDP per capita values as robustness check in section 4. 
7 We posit that traditional cultural decomposition at the country level do not grasp the vast within countries cultural 
heterogeneity. We do not choose where we are born and usually where we grow up (at least till the legal age of 
adulthood) but we might actually migrate thereafter.  
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brackets. In the same table the bottom part describes the location decomposition, showing for 





4. Empirical Analysis  
 
4.1. Baseline Model   
In our baseline empirical model, individual’s tax morale is a function of the four cultural 
variables we generated following Hofstede’s conceptualisation and an extensive set of 
covariates including demographic, contextual and temporal variables. We consider country 
fixed effect in order to capture possible omitted time-invariant cross-country differences 
(Tabellini 2010; Duranton et al. 2009). As noted elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Beugeldijsk 
et al, 2015), our cultural dimensions of interest are partially correlated between themselves and 
therefore are regressed one by one as well as all together (i.e. in a “horse-race” regression 
fashion).  
Table 2 reports the ordered logit estimations of our baseline model. As far as our cultural 
dimensions are concerned, we do find in all specifications a stable effect of culture on tax 
morale.  
Our results show that values of individualism are positively associated with tax morale: for a 
one-unit increase in the individualism score, the odds of high tax morale versus the combined 
middle and low categories are 1.001 times higher8, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the relationship 
between individualism/collectivism and law compliance may help explain this result. 
Individualism is characterised by self-determination and self-expression rather than subjecting 
one’s choice to the approval of a specific reference group. This would support individual’s 
initiative as well as individual’s responsibility towards legal rules and institutional compliance. 
In contrast, a society dominated by collectivistic values is characterised by low civic morality 
a-la Banfield (1958). In such society, social exchanges are set upon mutual obligations within 
the members of the reference group rather than on rule-of-law norm. In this case, enforcement 
and individual’s compliance are more likely to occur within than outside the reference group 
(Greif 1994).      
                                                            






With respect to Power Distance, our models report that values of power distance are negatively 
correlated to tax morale. For a one-unit increase in the power distance score, the odds of high 
tax morale versus the combined middle and low categories are 0.999 times smaller, ceteris 
paribus. It is well argued that citizens consider tax evasion more immoral in contexts with a 
stronger rule of law (Frey and Torgler 2007; Torgler 2005). In such contexts, the individual’s 
predisposition towards compliance is not solely the result of the punishment effect employed 
by the public authority in case of tax evasion. For example, Filippin, et al. (2013) find that tax 
morale is driven by individual traits rather than external elements. It also stems from the value 
attached to law abiding and civic duty (Orviska and Hudson 2003). The former can be related 
to objective responsibilities defined by the law, the latter to the subjective responsibilities 
within a code of conduct and behaviour. Both law abidance and civic duty contribute to the 
individuals’ moral attitude towards institutional compliance since, if violated, they can provide 
an individual with a feeling of guilt for having committed a wrong act and for having failed in 
complying with recognised ethical rules (Orviska and Hudson 2003). Regarding our results, 
high power distance signifies a negative view of power and wealth (Hofstede 1980; Litch et al 
2007. More specifically, power distance values drive individuals to perceive the authority as 
exploiting the use of power for the benefit of the elite at the cost of a more unequal 
redistribution of public resources. This is likely to undermine individual’s civic conscience of 
considering tax evasion wrong. On the contrary, values of low power distance feed the idea 
that the use of power should be subject to the rule of law which, in turn, should guarantee 
everyone the same rights regardless of their social status. Taxation, therefore, is viewed as a 
system with redistributive goal (Hofstede et al. 2010) driving individuals to perceive tax 
compliance as morally correct. 
With respect to uncertainty avoidance, our results suggest that higher individuals’ values of 
uncertainty avoidance are associated with lower tax morale. For a one-unit increase in the 
uncertainty avoidance score, the odds of high tax morale versus the combined middle and low 
categories are 0.998 times smaller, ceteris paribus. 
High uncertainty avoidance reflects societies with low tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Values of uncertainty avoidance drive individuals to prefer clear organisational structure and 
procedures in their institutions that help make events more predictable (Hofstede 2010). This 
could lead one to expect uncertainty avoidance to be associated with greater tax morale, as 
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citizens might value the predictability of the tax code. However, the tax collection process is 
often complex, and can be perceived by citizens to lack transparency. Recent institutional 
studies show that tax systems perceived as transparent and accountable by taxpayers increase 
their tax compliance (Ricciuti et al. 2019). On the contrary, the moral cost of rent-seeking 
behaviour such as corruption and tax evasion reduces when citizens perceive that the tax 
administration lacks of transparent procedures and when laws are too complex for citizens to 
understand without legal advice (Torgler 2005). In this context, people with high uncertainty 
avoidance might be more willing to tax evade, as complex tax systems and procedures may 
generate a greater feeling of ambiguity and lack of clarity (Richardson 2008). Indeed, evidence 
in the public economics literature suggests that complexity in tax system rules and procedures 
are associated with more tax evasion (Richardson 2006).  
Our results also suggest that values of femininity are positively associated with tax morale. For 
a one-unit increase in the femininity score (less masculinity), the odds of high tax morale versus 
the combined middle and low categories are 1.003 times higher, given the other variables are 
held constant in the model. With respect to tax compliance and rent-seeking behaviour the 
literature provides controversial results. On the one hand, masculinity values could be 
associated with a higher propensity to promoting one’s own success (Wingate, 1997), thus 
attracting scrutiny - including from tax auditors (Tsakumis et al, 2007)- and hence it could 
boost consciousness of tax compliance and rules conformity. On the one hand, it is argued that 
high masculinity emphasises individual success and achievement also at the cost of violating 
legal rules such as those of tax compliance (Richardson 2008). Our results clearly support this 
second perspective. Indeed, values of femininity commonly lie on societal goals of welfare and 
social care. They favour the development of a society socio-economically sustainable and 
inclusive supported by a well-established welfare system (Hofstede 2001). This perspective 
clearly combines with the importance of tax compliance and the moral and ethical duty to 
conform with the tax law.    
Importantly, we show that our results regarding the relationship between tax morale and 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are consistent across different specifications. In particular, the 
sign and significance of our key relationships of interest does not change in specifications with 
or without controls for religiosity, pro-sociality and institutional trust. This thus shows that the 
cultural dimensions we investigate matter per se to explain tax morale, and not through a 
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mediated effect via religiosity, pro-sociality or institutional trust.9 On an additional note, as 
argued in the literature on tax morale, institutional trust signals citizens’ higher confidence 
about the effectiveness and the accountability of the public authorities (Hooghe et al. 2015). 
This increases citizens’ loyalty towards public institutions and, hence, citizens’ moral 
motivations to comply with tax rules (Feld and Frey 2002). Likewise, tax morale increases with 
pro-sociality as prosocial individuals tend to be natural co-operator with a stronger moral duty 
in contributing towards the public good (Frey and Torgler 2007).  
As in Torgler (2006), our results also report that tax morale is higher among respondents 
declaring to be more religious. In Torgler’s analysis, religiosity increases tax morale as 
commitment to religious doctrines might inhibit illegal behaviour considered morally wrong 
and unacceptable (Torgler 2006). 
 
4.2.Model extension: Within Regions Variation and the Role of Cohorts  
While most of the literature so far has analysed the inter-play between cultural and institutional 
aspects within a country or using a cross-country focus, little attention has, to date, been 
devoted to the within-region and within-cohort dimensions.  
Despite the important insights that previous works have produced through a cross-country level 
and within-country variation approach (e.g. Davis and Williamson 2019), this country-based 
perspective carries two limitations. Within-country variations might ignore subtle differences 
in values at lower levels of aggregation (such as region or cohort) and, hence, they might mask 
important differences in the data that are interesting in themselves. Additionally, neglecting 
these differences might reduce the relevance of the relationships identified, due to omitted 
variable bias. 
Indeed, from a conceptual perspective, culture is more likely to assume a regional dimension. 
Cultural differences occur across regions, even within the same country (Kaasa 2015). In 
explaining differences in institutional quality between the north and south of Italy, the seminal 
work of Putnam et al. (1993) stresses the importance of analysing the impact of individuals’ 
values and social norms of trust and cooperation within regional variation. This perspective 
lays upon the argument that these values and norms might be affected by cultural aspects deep-
rooted in a more narrowly defined local history rather than in the national one. Accordingly, 
other insightful works on the impact of values and norms on different institutional and 
                                                            
9 Furthermore, the regression without institutional trust, pro-sociality and religiosity (available upon request) show 
fully consistent results. 
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economic performance have considered the regional dimension. For instance, in detecting the 
impact of individual’s altruistic values Guiso et al. (2004) show that values driving individuals 
to become blood donors are determined by the regional origins of the respondents. Similarly, 
recent work on inter-generational change in values has also shed new light into the slow process 
of change in time that can affect cultural values (Beugelsdijk, et al. 2015; Tarabar, 2019). 
From an empirical perspective, within country analyses can suffer from endogeneity problems 
due to reverse causality and omitted variable bias, particularly when the analysis focuses on 
the role of cultural aspects on other institutional outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2015). In the 
context of our own analysis, endogeneity could arise if tax morale and culture where somehow 
co-determined, if specific variables explaining tax morale are omitted or if cultural variables 
were imprecisely measured (measurement error bias), as can be the case for any variable 
constructed from survey data. Following, Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), our model 
extensions partly address these issues and explore whether the relationships identified with our 
cultural dimensions remain unaltered when adding increasingly narrowly defined fixed effects 
for regions, cohorts and regions x cohorts. In other words, we extend our baseline model by 




In Table 3 column 1 we run the baseline model using up-to 326 NUTS2 region dummies instead 
of country dummies. The impact of our cultural dimensions on individual’s tax morale remain 
broadly unaltered10 even if in the horse-race we are left with around 15.000 observations only. 
In column 2, we further add three-period cohort dummies (before 1938, 1939-1968, after 1968). 
The results remain fully consistent. Finally, in columns 3 we interact the three-period dummies 
(before 1938, 1938-1967, after 1967) with NUTS2 regions, as proxy for a fine-grained cohorts’ 
measurement and this entails an even more cogent definition of long-run cultural trait. Finally, 






                                                            
10 The significance of the power distance coefficient is now marginal, though. 
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5. Conclusions  
 
Compliance is equivalent to a cooperative solution to the collective action problem. Therefore, 
understanding the factors that help to sustain cooperation might help promote compliance. The 
Hobbesian solution to these problems lay on government coercion and, hence, deterrence. 
Individuals are legally bound to contribute to the public good if they do not want to incur 
punishment. However, monitoring the government represents the second-order collective 
action problem where government coercion is not a solution any longer. In other words, in 
Hobbes analysis the missing link is the role of the individuals and of the values driving their 
preferences and attitudes towards the contribution to the public good. Without neglecting the 
importance ofe system-level institutional quality, compliance with rules, in this specific case 
with tax rules, is the ultimate results of individual’s preferences. According to mainstream 
economics, these preferences are mainly driven by a cost-benefit analysis, in agreement with 
the Hobbesian solution mechanism (Becker 1974). The institutional economic approach, 
stresses, instead, the fact that individuals’ preferences are subject to norms and values, as well 
as moral motivations (Frey and Torgler 2007; Hodgson 2006; Ostrom 2010). 
In this work, we have argued that cultural values influence individuals’ predisposition towards 
tax compliance and we supported this perspective with consistent and robust evidence. These 
values matter because they provide each individual with a mental map of what is right and what 
is wrong (Greif 2006), affect individuals’ view about their role and responsibilities within their 
society and shape individuals’ perception of the role and responsibilities of the public 
authorities (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). In this respect, our results suggest that while values 
of femininity and individualism are positively associated with individuals’ tax morale, values 
of power distance and uncertainty avoidance show a negative association with tax morale.  
We however want to be cautious on what can be inferred from our analyses. We recognise that 
changes in individual cultural values over time are possible and consistent with evidence 
elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Beugelsdijk and Welzel, 2018), and could be related to 
endogenous institutional change (as discussed in Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). It would be too 
speculative, though, to discuss this type of institutional change on the basis of our results. This 
is because our analysis employs repeated cross-sections, suitable to report relationships that are 
static, within one-period, rather than dynamics. That said, exploring such dynamics would 
make for a very insightful follow up on our current research.     
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Even though the non-tangible nature of such values makes it difficult to pinpoint specific policy 
implications (Cline and Williamson 2017), our results suggest policymakers should proceed 
with caution when they want to implement a tax reform or when they would like to modify tax 
policies. Indeed, cultural values matter and cannot be neglected. It is thus important that 
policymakers learn from the effect that these cultural traits produce on individuals’ attitudes. 
As the literature on the economics of culture rightly underlines, suggesting specific policy 
recommendations for optimal solutions has two main drawbacks which, at the same time, may 
represent two learning outcomes. Firstly, as culture is slow moving, new policies are unlikely 
to immediately speed up cultural evolutions (Davis and Williamson 2019). This should thus 
encourage policymakers to proceed with caution when they want to implement a tax reform or 
when they would like to modify tax policies in view of a more efficient fiscal capacity. 
Secondly, cultural differences suggest that the same policies might function more in some 
contexts than in others according to the dominant cultural values (Cline and Williamson 2017; 
Grimmelikhuijsen and Porumbescu 2013). This is indeed reflected already in the variability 
observed in terms of tax compliance within the same country and thus within populations 
exposed to the same tax system. In this respect, while policymakers might be constrained 
regarding the implementation of tax policies set at a country level, they might have more 
flexibility in implementing tax policies targeted for specific socio-economic groups or local 
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Table 1 Birth-Location Cohorts Characteristics 
 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 
Definition of cohort Born between 1881-1938 Born between 1938-1967 Born after 1967 
Average birth year 1927 1954 1977 
 
Total number of 





Uncertainty        (10,630) 
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Horse-race           (8,504) 
    
 
 
NUTS2 location in [] 
parenthesis 
Power                       [97] 
Individualism [312] 
Femininity [313] 
Uncertainty             [306] 
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Table 2 baseline Ordered Logit Regressions – Coefficients reported in Odds Ratios* 
 
Power 
Distance  Individualism  Femininity  
Uncertainty 























































































































































Observations 38,358 70,034 70,241 55,013 26,407 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0360 0.0394 0.0435 0.0458 0.0383 
Gender Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Marital Status 
Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of 
Employment 
Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Income Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Religious 
Denomination 
Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Wave Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the country in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Reported Odd-ratios (ordered logit “eform”, see text). Notice that estimations reported in odd-ratio imply that a coefficient indicates a 
positive effect if it is above the value 1 and a negative effect if it is below value 1. All regressions include control dummies for gender, 




Table 3 Ordered logit with granular controls: NUTS2, cohort, cohort*location, regional 
GDPpc. Coefficients reported in Odd-Ratios  
 Nuts2 only 






































































































































































































squared 0.0554 0.0554 0.0660 
0.0603 
0.0383 
Gender Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Marital Status 
Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of 
Employment 









Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort Dummy NO YES(age)a YES(age*location) YES(age*location) NO 
Wave Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Country 




Dummy YES YES YES 
YES 
NO 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: column 1 and 2 clustered at the NUTSII level; column 3 and 4 clustered at the cohort level 
(age*location); column 5 clustered at the country level (as in table 2), p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Reported Odd-ratios (ordered logit “eform”, see text). Notice that estimations reported in odd-ratio imply that a coefficient indicates a 
positive effect if it is above the value 1 and a negative effect if it is below value 1. All regressions include control dummies for gender, 
marital status, type of employment, self-reported income brackets, religion denomination, Wave and -with the exception of the last column 
that is reported from table 2- NUTS2 dummies. 
a) We test for the null hypothesis whether the three cohort dummies (cohort born before 1938 included; cohort born between 1939 
and 1968; cohort born after 1968) are statistically different from each other as far as the conditional mean tax morale is concerned. 





Table A1: Summary Statistics   
 No of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
KEY VARIABLES      
Tax Morale  161478 8.525 2.295 1 10 
Power Distance 76206 0.00 1.00 -1.292 2.140 
Individualism 142031 0.00 1.00 -1.583 0.632 
Femininity  149933 0.00 1.00 -0.861 1.161 
Uncertainty avoidance 116312 0.00 1.00 -0.426 2.345 
CONTROLS      
Religion important in life 143186 2.404 1.055 1 4 
State of health (subjective) 122904 2.263 0.959 1 5 
Institutional trust 163946 2.520 0.616 1 4 
Pro-sociality 163526 0.067 0.113 0 1 
Age 164393 44.988 17.520 15 108 
Age when completed education 158468 18.490 5.407 0 96 
Income level 137440 1.971 0.792 1 3 
Gender (1=male) 164899 1.541 0.498 1 2 
Marital Status      
Married 164035 0.576 0.494 0 1 
Living together as married 164035 0.027 0.164 0 1 
Divorced 164035 0.056 0.231 0 1 
Separated 164035 0.014 0.117 0 1 
Widowed 164035 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Single/never married 164035 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Employment Status      
Employed Full time 163352 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Employed part time 163352 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Self employed 163352 0.057 0.231 0 1 
Retired 163352 0.202 0.401 0 1 
Housewife 163352 0.108 0.310 0 1 
Student 163352 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Unemployed 163352 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Other 163352 0.018 0.131 0 1 
Religious Denomination      
Buddhist 123733 0.001 0.028 0 1 
Free/Non-denominational church 123733 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Hindu 123733 0.001 0.029 0 1 
Jew 123733 0.002 0.045 0 1 
Muslim 123733 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Orthodox 123733 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Other 123733 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Protestant 123733 0.223 0.416 0 1 
Roman Catholic 123733 0.488 0.500 0 1 
 
